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2Abstract
This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market
economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization
mechanisms.  Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms
observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently suboptimal privatization mechanism:
private negotiations.
We develop a simple model wherein privatization is to be carried out by a government
agent who plays favorites among bidders and is potentially disciplined by forthcoming elections.
We find that it is the degree of political constraints that determines which mechanism is more
successful in raising funds.  If the political environment is such that the privatization agent
himself aims at raising the fair value for the company, then privatization auctions and private
negotiations are equally successful in raising public revenues.  If, however, political constraints
distort the agent’s incentives, then one mechanism outperforms the other.  In particular, if the
distortion is moderate, then private negotiations can raise more value for a successful enterprise
than privatization auctions.  In this case the agent may play favorites among the bidders, but to
the extent he cares about the price, he will use his bargaining power to negotiate his target price.
If, however, the distortion is severe so that the agent lacks sufficient motivation to raise a fair
price for the company, then privatization auctions will outperform private negotiations.  Even
though the agent may play favorites among the bidders, he would not put pressure on the bidders
to raise the price during negotiations.  In an auction, in contrast, the presence of other bidders,
regardless how informed they are, induces competition and places a lower bound on the
equilibrium winning bid.  We also show that information disclosure laws may have negative
welfare implications: they may help the privatization agent to collude with some of the bidders to
the disadvantage of non-colluding bidders.  Our theory provides further regulatory implications
for privatization procedures in emerging market economies.
31 Introduction
With the increasing prominence of emerging markets and newly privatized economies, the role of
banks and markets and the strategies of privatization have become topics of central importance in
public policy.  This in turn has generated an increased academic focus on the design of markets
and institutions (for example, Berkovitch and Israel (1996), Boot and Thakor (1994), Diamond
(1996), Titman and Subrahmanyam (1997)).
One interesting issue in institutional design is how to transfer state-owned enterprises to
private investors.  Privatization of state-owned enterprises has grown into an economic tidal wave
during the 1990s.  Existing literature highlights the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms
used in different settings (see for example Frydman and Rapaczynsky (1991)) and documents the
use of numerous and arguably suboptimal mechanisms, particularly the overwhelming choice of
private negotiations in Eastern Europe (Figure 1).
In their detailed analysis of the Polish, Czech and Russian privatization processes,
Boycko et al. (1994) argue that privatization mechanisms in these countries were selected on the
basis of political constraints and were simplified to meet political feasibility even at the expense
of economic principles.  The importance of political considerations in the choice of a
privatization mechanism is also emphasized by Baldwin and Bhattacharyya (1991) in their case
study of the privatization of Conrail by the US government.  In 1984, an auction was held by the
Department of  Transportation to sell the government’s 85% stake in Conrail.  A group of private
investors challenged the auction and no proposal succeeded to win congressional approval.  In
1987 a public equity offering of Conrail netted the government $700 million more than the
winning bid in the auction.
An important aspect of privatization in emerging market economies is the extent to which
the flow of information is controlled by the people in charge of privatization. Privatization in
these countries is typically carried out by an agent who derives private benefits from his position.
This agent is either the manager of the state-owned company who is appointed to privatize his or
her company1, or a government bureaucrat from the state privatization agency.  In either case the
                                            
    1 A commonly used privatization mechanism for small and medium-sized companies in Hungary, called
self-privatization, is to appoint the manager of the state-owned firm to privatize his or her company (Major
(1994)).
4privatization agent is in a position to potentially monopolize information about the company in
question.2 Business and financial information is typically scarce in emerging market economies.
Financial markets are nonexistent or barely at their infancy.  Many of the companies that are up
for sale have never been audited before and follow ancient accounting practices.  It is hard to
know where to look for information3.  Te  different information sources may be circulating while
the eleventh with the most relevant information remains hidden.  Being in charge, the agent may
have access to this eleventh source of superior information about the company’s assets, or he may
have private information about the privatization of competing businesses that can affect future
competition of the firm. In either case, the agent may choose to disclose his information to a
favorite bidder only. In our model we are concerned with the potential impact of the privatization
agent providing informational advantage to one of the bidders.
One important political factor in the privatization process is how much money can be
raised by the sale of state-owned companies.  Whereas in developed markets these funds may be
of lesser importance, in transitional economies they represent a token of a successful start.4 In
addition to incentives to raise revenues, another important aspect of privatization in emerging
market economies is the public concern for entrepreneurs losing money in the privatization
process5. These goals translate into an incentive scheme that penalizes the privatization agent for
a positive value-price differential ex-post while it does not reward him for raising more than the
company is worth. When modeling the privatization process in emerging market economies, our
aim is to incorporate these incentives into the objective function of the privatization agent.
The political factors that the privatization process entails in emerging market economies
are the focus of our paper.  First, conflict-of-interest regulations naturally exclude explicit profit-
sharing contracts between the Treasury and the political-bureaucrat in charge of privatization.
Profit-sharing contracts with politicians are politically unacceptable in both developed and
                                            
   2For a different view of the advantage of developed markets in diffusing information as compared to
emerging markets see Berkovitch and Israel (1996).
   3As J. Mark Mobius, portfolio manager of the Templeton Russia fund explains:  “We invest in the face of
very iffy data.  The amount of information available leaves a lot to be desired.” (Best Single Country Fund:
Templeton Russia, Mutual Funds, March 1997, Page 48).
   4 The funds raised through privatization can be used to pay off the country’s debt, endow the social
security system and thereby lower the tax rate for businesses and decrease the resistance against the
privatization process itself.
   5To prevent severe losses by entrepreneurs, governments in these economies frequently grant bidders the
right to sell the privatized company back to the government within a period of three to five years at the
price it was purchased for, or, alternatively, offer compensation packages for unexpected losses incurred by
entrepreneurs during the first few years of operation (Major (1994)).
5emerging market economies since they are viewed as wealth transfers to those who hold public
office.  Secondly, political factors may also weaken the enforcement of social contracts (La Porta
et al (1996)).  In particular, if the country's attention is focused on issues of national security or
ethnic conflicts, then privatization may seem too small an issue to warrant attention and the
privatization agent may not be disciplined despite large value-price differentials6.  Finally, beside
aiming at a fair price, non-price criteria such as employment, investment or national interest
(Fluck, John and Ravid (1996)) may also constrain the privatization process.  These objectives
may also alter the incentives of those involved in the privatization process and make the modeling
of the bidding process substantially more complex.
Auctions and private negotiations are the most widely employed privatization
mechanisms in emerging market economies.  The typical auctions are first-price sealed-bid
auctions ("The Revenge of the Nerds", 1994). Our paper investigates how much revenue
privatization auctions and private negotiations raise in emerging market economies by explicitly
modeling the political constraints discussed above.
We find that in addition to the negotiating skills of the agent, it is the degree of political
constraints that determines which mechanism is more successful in raising funds.  If the
privatization agent himself aims at raising the fair value for the company, then privatization
auctions and private negotiations are equally successful in raising public revenues.  In this case
the privatization agent will disclose all information publicly and, consequently, the winning bid
will approach value.  If, however, political constraints distort the agent's incentives, then one
mechanism outperforms the other.  In particular, if the distortion is moderate, then private
negotiations can raise more value for a successful enterprise than privatization auctions. When
political constraints distort the agent's incentives, then he may no longer choose to make all
information public.  In this case the agent may play favorites among the bidders, but to the extent
he cares about the price, he will use his bargaining power to negotiate his target price.  As long as
the agent's target exceeds the expected winning bid of a respective privatization auction with
asymmetric information, private negotiations can attain higher revenues than privatization
auctions.  If, however, the distortion is severe so that the agent lacks sufficient motivation to raise
                                            
6  As the following example illustrates one can control the public reaction to the announcement of the
winning bid by picking the time of the announcement carefully: "The whole telecommunication industry
competed in the tender of the first Austrian private mobile phone system.  Victor Klima, who conducted the
tender proved to be an excellent tactician.  Even though he selected the bidder with fourth highest bid as the
6a fair price for the company, then privatization auctions will outperform private negotiations with
respect to revenues raised.  Even though the agent may play favorites among the bidders, he
would not put pressure on the bidders to raise the price during negotiations.  However, in a
privatization auction the presence of less informed bidders induces the colluding bidder to
compete and places a lower bound on the equilibrium winning bid.
The intuition is that even though a bureaucrat in charge of the privatization process may
compromise both auctions and private negotiations, he or she has much less direct control over
the outcome of an auction than the outcome of private negotiations.  Whereas in private
negotiations the privatization agent can potentially attain his most preferred outcome, the winning
bid in an auction may very well exceed or fall short of the agent's target.  If the agent's target is
sufficiently high, the expected winning bid in the privatization auction is likely to fall short of the
agent's target.  If the agent's target is low, then the expected winning bid in the auction is likely to
beat the agent's target. Interestingly, our results hold regardless of whether information disclosure
is mandated for the bidders in the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the assumptions
of the model.  In Section 3 we discuss the benchmark case when the privatization agent
voluntarily reveals information to all bidders.  In Section 4 and 5 we investigate the optimality of
auctions versus private negotiations when disclosure rules are in effect and when they are not in
effect. In Section 6 we discuss the regulatory implications of our model. In Section 7 we present a
detailed discussion of related technical literature.  We close the paper with some concluding
remarks and recommendations for the design of privatization procedures.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic setup
We consider a company to be privatized which can be either a g m or a lemon with equal
probabilities.  The gem is valued at v , the lemon is valued at v.  There are two bidders for the
company in question.  The bidders are risk-neutral profit-maximizers.  Each bidder is equally
capable of operating the company.  The bidders know the agent's preferences and the distribution
of company values.  They may learn the value of the company they bid for if the agent who has
                                                                                                                              
winner, he made the announcement just before New Year's Eve, when half of Austria is skiing and thereby
managed to avoid the public outcry as well as subsequent lawsuits ("The Politician" (1997)).
7access to the company's books discloses the books to both or one of the bidders, or if they decide
to purchase information from a research company.  Once the winner starts running the privatized
company, the value of the company is publicly revealed.
The privatization program is to be carried out by a government agent who derives utility
from both pecuniary benefits, m, and private benefits from staying in office, W.  The pecuniary
benefits are the side-payments he receives if he colludes with a bidder.7 The non-p cuniary
benefits, W capture the value of perks, power, and the agent's ability to generate side-payments in
the future. We normalize the agent’s salary to zero.
The agent maximizes the sum of his monetary payoff and his expected private benefits.
Our specification for the agent’s preferences stems from the corporate control literature.
Examples of similar objective functions in the context of selling an enterprise include Grossman
and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), Hart and Moore (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1995),
Burkart et al. (1998).
The agent’s monetary payoff, m, depends on the value-price differential, v-p, and on his
bargaining power (negotiating skills), a. The higher the value-price differential, v-p, the more the
colluding parties can split as side-payment. Moreover, the agent can extract more from the bidder,
the better his bargaining position, a is. Note that the extreme cases of no rent-sharing rule out
collusion. If the bidder is able to capture all the rents, the agent’s objective reduces to maximizing
his expected private benefits from staying in office. In this case the agent has no incentive to
collude with the bidders. If all rents accrue to the privatization agent, then the bidders have no
incentive to collude with the agent. As long as the official expects future favors from the
colluding bidder when he is dismissed (eg. a high level appointment in the bidder’s firm), he is
willing to split the rents with the bidder. Similarly, as long as the colluding bidder expects future
                                            
7 This paper focuses on collusion between a bidder and a seller’s representative. As such, it provides new
insights into this type of collusion. While collusion among bidders received  a lot of attention in the
literature (see McAfee and McMillan (1987) p. 724. or R thkopf and Harstad (1994) for excellent surveys
of this literature or Porter and Zona (1993) for a recent study of this type of collusion), collusion between a
bidder and a seller’s representative is still largely unexplored. Although we recognize that collusion  among
bidders may affect privatization auctions as well, to keep our model tractable  we assume away the
possibility of this type of collusion here. Nevertheless, we would like to point out that the first-price
auctions we discuss are somewhat less susceptible to bidder’s collusion than second-price auctions. For a
real-life perspective on the subject, see Cramton’s (1997) comprehensive description of the considerations
underlying the design of the FCC spectrum auctions.
8favors from the privatization agent if the agent stays in office (eg. f rmation about companies to
be privatized later), he is willing to share his rents with the agent.
The agent’s expected private benefits depend on the likelihood that he remains in office
in the future. In the corporate finance context it is common to assume that the agent loses his
private benefits of control with a certain probability. This would happen when he is dismissed due
to decisions by the corporate board, proxy fights, takeovers and bankruptcies. Such models were
developed by, among others, Harris and Raviv (1988), and Stulz (1988), and Fluck (1998).
In our context of privatization, the likelihood that an agent stays in office depends on his
performance and on whether or not public attention is focused on privatization. If the public
focuses on privatization issues and it is learned that a company was sold at a price far below value
then the agent is dismissed. Hence we model the probability, p, that the agent is dismissed as an
increasing function of the value-price differential, v-p. That is, the larger the discrepancy
between the value of the company and the price the winner paid for it, the more likely it is that
public attention should turn to privatization issues and the agent will be dismissed.  The value of
p is positive and increasing for v > p and 0 for v £ p.  Thus the agent's objective function takes
the following form:
where p characterizes the economy, W the privatization agent and a the bargaining process.
Notice that the privatization agent faces the following trade-off when deciding how to
price the firm: On the one hand, he would like to sell the firm for a low price to capture some of
the buyer’s profits. On the other hand, he would like to sell the firm for a price as high as possible
so as to increase his chances of keeping his private benefits.
We compare two mechanisms, a first-price sealed-bid (common-value) auction and
private negotiations, with a minimum bid set at v in ei her case. Since one of our aims is to derive
policy implications for the privatization process, we want to model auctions and private
negotiations in a manner that closely approximates the actual bidding process. In privatization
)1( W p))  (v   (1  ) p,  v( max
p
                                                                             ,´--+- pam
9auctions bidding is allowed only in currency units or multiples of currency units8. Thus, in our
model bidding is conducted in multiples of currency units with the smallest allowable bidding
unit set at e. In other words, one can bid v, v +e, v + 2e, etc.
There are two bidders in the auction. Unlike open auctions that can always attract
additional bidders (Hendricks et al. (1993), Bulow and Klemperer (1996)), potential bidders in
privatization auctions of emerging market economies come from a tight group of insiders. Some
of these insiders have close ties with those in charge of the privatization process and tend to be
frequent participants at other privatization auctions.  The typical bidders are competitor-firms,
well-known wealthy individuals, or investor groups.  They are screened well in advance to assure
that they can raise the necessary funds to finance the deal. Thus, we model privatization auctions
and private negotiations with a fixed number of bidders, one of whom may have a continuing
relationship with the privatization agent.
In the case of the auction the timing of the model is as follows. The privatization agent
decides whether to disclose information to one or both parties or to none at all.  The colluding
parties privately agree on the side-payment conditional on the value-price differential.  Since the
agent may have difficulty in enforcing the bidders’ promises (bids or side-payments) ex-post, the
side-payments are assumed to be made up-front. If the agent’s bargaining power is a, then, for
the good company, the bidder pays the agent a fraction of the expected value-price differential as
side-payment, where expectation is taken over the set of possible winning bids in the auction.9
Uninformed bidders can decide whether or not to purchase information at a cost c from a business
research company who can assess the company's true worth.  Our modeling choice of assuming
such high level of precision by the research company substantially simplifies the analysis without
altering the nature of our results.  With appropriate changes in the parameter restrictions, our
results will carry through even if (1) the information purchased from the research company has
lower precision than the information revealed by the privatization officials; or (2) the information
                                            
8 Much of the auction literature analyzes continuous auctions. However all real-life auctions are, almost by
definition, discrete. In fact, in the largest auction to date in this country, the FCC spectrum auction, the
FCC explicitly set discrete bid increments (the design also included discrete time intervals between bids).
As it turned out, there were interesting behavioral consequences to the discrete bid intervals, as is the case
in our paper (see Cramton (1997)).
9 Our result would be qualitatively the same, if the side-payment would be a fracti n of the expected value-
price differential with expectation taken over the set of possible winning bids in the auction conditional on
the colluding bidder winning, or if the side-payments were to be paid ex-post. In the latter case, however,
the enforcement of  the side-payments ex-post  might pose a problem for the agent.
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purchased from the research company is complementary to the information of the privatization
official.
In the case of private negotiations the privatization agent decides whether to disclose
information to one or both parties or to none at all.  If he decides to disclose information publicly,
then he can only accept bids that approximate value. If he decides to disclose information
privately, then he approaches one of the bidders.  He offers to disclose information and sell the
company to the bidder in exchange of sharing the rents. Since the agent has less leverage to
enforce the bidders’ promises ex-post, the side-payments are assumed to be made up-front. If the
agent’s bargaining power is a, then, the parties negotiate a payment v + a(v - v) from the bidder
to the agent. That is, each party’s share of the rents is proportional to his bargaining power. The
payment is v + a(v - v) for the good company and v  for the bad. Since the bidder is indifferent as
to how much of his payment become public revenue and how much will end up as a bribe, he lets
the agent decide the price that will be publicly announced, and lets him pocket the rest of the
payment. Naturally, the agent chooses the price that maximizes his objective function (1) subject
to the constraints that m + p = v + a(v - v), m ³ 0, p ³ 0.
 Once the winner starts to operate the company, the value of the company is publicly
revealed.  If public attention is focused on privatization, and if there is a discrepancy between the
value of the company and the price paid for it, then the official is dismissed.  If the public
attention is focused on issues other than privatization then the agent stays in office.
Since it has been suggested that information disclosure laws generate more revenues by
making the privatization process more transparent, we consider two alternative scenarios in our
model. In the first scenario (Section 4) disclosure laws in the sense of Grossman and Hart (1980)
are in effect; in the second scenario (Section 5) information disclosure is not mandated. When no
disclosure laws are in effect, then the purchase of information remains the parties’ private
information. When disclosure laws are in effect, parties who purchased information are expected
to disclose their information.
Naturally, disclosure rules do not bind the colluding bidder.  Since bribery is a more
serious offense than failing to reveal information, this bidder’s agreement with the privatization
agent is kept in secret.  Hence he appears to be uninformed from the point of view of the legal
system. There is one additional assumption needed here, however. This assumption concerns the
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rate of detection for collusion. In particular, when bribery is a more serious offense than failing to
reveal information, then, for the act of collusion to be incentive compatible for the bidder, it must
be the case that bribery is more difficult to discover. This assumption seems reasonable, since
collusion is typically carried out in a careful manner, and therefore it is rather difficult to prove.
This contrasts with business transactions such as purchasing information from a research
company which leave a paper trail behind. These transactions are more easily traceable through
bills and tax filings.
Note that the willingness of the bidders to collude with the privatization agent depends on
the expected legal cost of being caught. Thus, when the rate of detection for collusion is
sufficiently low, then it becomes incentive compatible for one bidder to collude with the agent
and for another bidder to voluntarily reveal information purchased from the research company.
3. The case of voluntary information revelation
We first discuss a benchmark case in which the agent greatly values staying in office so
that he refuses to be bribed and voluntarily reveals information to all bidders.  This is a scenario
in which political constraints do not matter.  The privatization agent refuses bribe and voluntarily
discloses all information whenever he values staying in office more than any bribe. Formally,
(2)))()(W x                                                               p  v     p  v ( eepp --³--
for every p ³ v. For every p, the right hand side shows the maximum bribe the official can get
when he raises p and accepts a bribe as opposed to raising v - e and accepting no side-payment.
The left hand side of the inequality shows the difference between the expected private benefits
associated with these strategies.
If both bidders know the value of the company, then they would bid aggressively so that
price would approach value.
Proposition 1 When the privatization agent discloses information to both bidders then the
subsequent sealed-bid auction facilitates the transfer of ownership at a price p = v -e for th
good company, and at a price p = v  for the bad company in any perfect equilibrium.
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The intuition is straightforward.  If both bidders know that the company is a lemon, then
neither will bid more than v in equilibrium.  If, however, they find out that the company is good,
then they will not bid below e  v -  since they may lose the auction otherwise.  If either bids v ,
then she may win or tie with the other bidder.  In either case zero profit is made.  Either bidder
can do at least as well by lowering her bid to v -e.  Bidding v -e for the company yields an
expected profit e/2 for both bidders in equilibrium.
When there are no political constraints, then for the privatization agent maximizing utility
is equivalent to minimizing the probability of being dismissed.  We can trivially show:
Proposition 2 Whenever (2) holds, the privatization agent voluntarily reveals information to both
bidders in any perfect equilibrium.
Whenever (2) holds, then revealing information to both parties, as Proposition 1
demonstrates, leads to the price that maximizes the utility of the privatization agent.  Obviously,
no strategy can improve upon this.  In fact, as we shall see later, other strategies will result in
strictly worse outcomes from the agent's point of view.
Disclosure rules do not matter when (2) holds.  Since both parties are getting information
from the privatization agent, nobody is purchasing information, so there is nothing to disclose.
Finally, whenever, (2) holds, then an auction is as good a revenue-maximizer as private
negotiations.  The privatization agent who publicly reveals information to both bidders can
extract nearly full value from the bidders: they will be indifferent between buying at value or
walking away.
Proposition 3 Whenever (2) holds, the privatization agent raises e   v -  for the good company
and v  for the bad company through private negotiations.
The next sections focus on the behavior of approachable agents.  An agent is called
approachable if for a high enough bribe he is willing to compromise public revenues.  Formally,
an agent is approachable if W x eepp --<--   v v ))(  v  v )(( . When the agent is
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approachable disclosure rules make a difference.  As we shall see later they play an important
role in our discussion.
4. Privatization when disclosure laws are in effect
We investigate two scenarios. In one case, information disclosure laws are in effect
(Section 4). In the other case, information disclosure is not mandated (Section 5). Mandatory
information disclosure applies to bidders in takeover contests in the United States (Grossman and
Hart (1980)).
We model disclosure rules in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1980), that is, disclosure
rules require that any information that a party has about the value of the company must be
revealed to everybody.  In our model it is equivalent to requesting that the research company
reveal its client list or else lose its license. Such rules can be mandated relatively easily. As we
shall see later, most of our findings generalize to the case when information disclosure is not
mandated. Interestingly, public revenues will generally be higher when information disclosure is
not mandated.
Disclosure rules have two implications in our model.  They force the party who
purchased information to reveal this information and thereby reveal their identity.  Secret
information transactions on the other hand, by nature, are not known to anyone but the parties
involved.  When disclosure rules are in effect the model takes the following form.
The official 
reveals The bidders may Auction          Ownership is
information to one, (publicly) or private        transferred.
both or none purchase negotiation   
             of the bidders.            information. takes place.
       0                  1                       2                     3                      4
 Figure 2: The timing of the model when disclosure rules are in effect.
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Since disclosure rules have no impact on the colluding parties who do not comply with
them, they enable the colluding parties to fully realize their cost advantage over the noncolluding
party.  As a consequence, it does not pay for the noncolluding party to purchase information
unless the cost of acquiring information is negligible.  The outcome is an auction with
asymmetrically informed bidders.
Proposition 4When disclosure rules are in effect and when the privatization agent discloses
information to one bidder only, then one of the following applies:
(1) if c £ Î /4, then the noncolluding party always purchases information and the subsequent
sealed-bid auction facilitates the transfer of the good company's ownership at price ;e-= vp
(2) if c > Î /4, then no party purchases information. There is a unique perfect Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies in the subsequent sealed-bid auction in which the expected winning bid for the
good company is significantly below the unconditional expected value, 
2
vv+
.
Proof: in Appendix.
The colluding parties have an advantage with respect to their cost of producing
information.  When disclosure laws are in effect then, in equilibrium, each bidder knows who the
informed parties are.  The identity of the party who purchased information is disclosed and the
identity of the colluding party is revealed in equilibrium since all parties have rational
expectations.  Therefore, as long as the information structure is symmetric and the cost of
purchasing information is non-negligible, colluding parties can realize their cost advantage in
obtaining information.  Notice that if the information provided by the research company is of
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lower precision than the information obtained from the privatization official, the threshold for
information purchase will be lower than  / 4.
There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the sealed-bid auction.  Since the
uninformed would never want to place a bid higher than  
2
vv+
any bid above 
2
vv+
 is a
winning bid.  A bid above 
2
vv+
 is not a best response for the colluding bidder unless the
uninformed is bidding exactly 
2
vv+
 or in case  
2
vv+
is not an acceptable bid, the highest
allowable bid below  
2
vv+
.   In case the colluding bidder does bid this high, it is not a best
response for the uninformed to bid   
2
vv+
. However, if the informed bids less than  
2
vv+
in
the good state, then it is a best response for the uninformed to place a higher bid (but never higher
than  
2
vv+
) independently of the realization of the state.
Staying out is not a Nash equilibrium strategy either.
There is a unique perfect Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, however.  The
equilibrium is such that no bid exceeds the unconditional expected value with positive
probability.  The equilibrium is very intuitive.  In this equilibrium the colluding party always bids
v when the company is of low quality.  When the company is of high quality, the informed mixes
between his sure winning bid (the one just below the unconditional expected value ) that may be
unnecessarily high and lower bids that are potentially more profitable winning bids.  The
uninformed bids either cautiously or aggressively, each with high probability so as to minimize
his potential realized losses and his opportunity losses.
Obviously, private negotiations are not affected by disclosure rules. We illustrate the
outcome of the auction and of private negotiations with a simple example.
Example 1:
Let v  = $1 million and v= $6 million.  The increment between subsequent bids is $1 million.
The unconditional expected value of the company is $3.5 million.  The government agent's
private benefits from staying in office is $4 million.  The cost of information purchase is
$750,000.  The political constraints specified by the probability
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of dismissal are as follows:
otherwise.  0.2 )-p-v( p)-v(  and 3   p- v  if 0.08  )( ´=£´--=- epep pvp)v( 
Private negotiations:
The parties negotiate a payment v + a(v - v) from the bidder to the agent for the good company.
That is, each party’s share is proportional to its bargaining power. Since the bidder is indifferent
as to how much of his payment become public revenue and how much end up as bribe, he lets the
agent decide the price that will be publicly announced, and lets him pocket the rest of the
payment. The agent chooses m and p that maximize (1) subject to the constraints that m + p = v +
a(v - v), m ³ 0, p ³ 0. The colluding bidder makes a profit of (1-a)(v - v) million.  When the
value of the company is revealed, the agent faces a dismissal with probability p(v -p). For
example, if a=2/3, then the agent will negotiate a price of $4 million, and pocket a bribe of 1/3 of
a million. His utility from doing this will be 4.01 million that is higher than the 4 million he can
achieve by revealing information publicly. The bidder receives a profit of 5/3 of a million. The
agent faces a dismissal with probability 0.08.
The auction:
Perfection implies that no party plays weakly dominated strategies. This requirement rules out the
colluding party bidding above v wh n the company is of low quality.  After iteratively eliminating
the remaining weakly dominated strategies, we get the set of strategies that may be played with
positive probability in any perfect Nash equilibria.  Applying the iterated dominance argument we
find that (step 1) the noncolluding party will never purchase information; (step 2) the
noncolluding party will not bid more than the unconditional expected value, $3.5 million; (step 3)
the colluding party will not bid above $3.5 million with positive probability for the good
company; (step 4) the colluding party will not bid $1 million with positive probability for the
good company.
There is a unique perfect equilibrium strategy q for the colluding party which specifies
bidding 2 and 3 with positive probabilities for the good company. When the colluding party plays
his equilibrium strategy, the uninformed non-colluding party is indifferent between  unconditional
bids of 1, 2 and 3, and is never inclined to bid more than 3.  Bidding 1 yields 0 to the
noncolluding party since it is never the winning bid when the company is good.  Bidding 2 for the
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bad company brings a loss of 1 million  to the uninformed. Bidding 2 for the good company and
getting it yields a profit of 4 million to him. When bidding 2, he incurs a loss with probability ½.
He profits from bidding 2 only when the colluding party also bids 2 and their bids tie. The
colluding party bids 2 for the good company with probability q2, so the non-colluding party
profits from bidding 2 with probability q2/2. Thus, bidding 2 yields an expected profit of 2q2  -
0.5.  Bidding 3 for the bad company brings a loss of 2 million to the uninformed.  Bidding 3 for
the good company and getting it yields a profit of 3 million to him.  When bidding 3, he incurs a
loss with probability 1/2.  He profits from bidding 3 with probability q2 + 
2
3q .  Thus, bidding 3
yields an expected payoff of 3(q2 + 
2
3q ) - 1 to the uninformed. Furthermore,
q2 + q3 + q4 + q5  = 0.5.
Similar reasoning establishes that for the colluding party bidding 1 yield 
2
5 1p , bidding 2
yields )
2
p
(p4 21 + , bidding 3 yields )2
p
p(p3 321 ++ , bidding 4 yields 2(p1+ p2 + p3).
Furthermore, p1+ p2 + p3 = 1. In equilibrium, each bidder is indifferent between strategies that are
played with positive probabilities and prefer these strategies to those that are played with zero
probability.
Solving the resulting system of equations, we get q2 = 
6
1
, q3 = 
3
1
, q4 = 0 and p1 = 0.6, p2
= 0, p3 =0.4.  That is, in equilibrium, the colluding party bids 3 with probability 2/3 and 2 with
probability 1/3 when the company is good. Furthermore, if the noncolluding party bids 1 with
probability 3/5, 3 with probability 2/5, then in the good state the colluding party is indifferent
between bidding 2 and 3, prefers either of these bids to 4, and may as well bid 2 with probability
1/3 and 3 with probability 2/3. Similarly, if the colluding party bids 2 with probability 1/3 and 3
with probability 2/3 for the good company and 1 for the bad company, then the non-colluding
party is indifferent between  bidding 1 and 3 and might as well bid 1 with probability 3/5 and 3
with probability 2/5.  The colluding party wins the good company with probability 11/15.
The joint distribution of bids is shown in Table 1 and is illustrated in Figure 3 and 4.  The
expected price at which the good company is sold turns out to be $2.8 million, about 20 percent
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below the unconditional expected value and less than half of what the company is worth10.    This
significant underpricing happens even when the agent himself would prefer a price of $4 million
and is able to negotiate this price in the absence of the auction.  This would happen for example
when a= 2/3. However, when his only option is to conduct an auction he prefers the expected
winning bid of $2.8 million to the $5 million he can raise by foregoing his bribe and revealing
information to both bidders.  His utility from raising $5 million by foregoing his bribe and
revealing information to both bidders is $4 million.  When he reveals information to one bidder
only, he raises $2 million with probability 1/5 and $3 million with probability 4/5 for the good
company.  He receives a bribe of 1/5 ´ a ´ $4 million + 4/5 ´ a ´ $3 million = 16/5 ´ a.
Depending on a, he prefers revealing information to one bidder only. This happens for example
when a=2/3. In this case, the agent prefers revealing information to one bidder only, since by
doing so, he expects the equivalent of 5.14 million in utility terms. ¨
So far we have assumed that when auction mechanism is used to privatize the company
the official discloses information to one or both party.  Our next step is to establish that the
official will always designate at least one party as informed in equilibrium.  As Proposition 5
below shows, the official will always prefer disclosing information to both bidders to not
disclosing information to anyone.  Depending on his preferences, he either prefers to disclose
information to one bidder only (see Example 1) or to both bidders (see the case of voluntary
information revelation).
Proposition 5 When disclosure rules are in effect and when a sealed-bid auction is used to sell
the company, then in equilibrium the official will reveal information to at least one bidder.
Proof: in Appendix.
Next we investigate conditions under which one mechanism outperforms the other.  In an
ex ante comparison private negotiations dominate auctions if the negotiated price p* exceeds the
expected winning bid in the auction E(bw).  This can happen for a wide range of preferences and
bargaining skills, since the expected winning bid in the auction for the good company is
                                            
10 The expected price the colluding party pays for the good company when he wins is $2.7 million, so the
colluding party pays less than the noncolluding party when winning the good company.
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significantly below 
2
vv+
.  Given a, the more the agent values staying in office or the less
approachable he is, the higher the revenues private negotiations generate.
Proposition 6 Suppose that c > 
4
Î
 and p*, the price the official would negotiate if he colluded
with a bidder exceeds the expected winning bid in the auction with asymmetrically informed
bidders E (bw). Then, depending on the parameter values, one of  four scenarios emerges:
(i) Regardless of the mechanism used, the privatization agent reveals information
publicly. Auctions raise as much revenues as private negotiations do.
(ii) Regardless of the mechanism used, the privatization agent reveals information to one
bidder only.  Private negotiations raise more revenues for the sale of good companies, auctions
raise more revenues for the sale of bad companies.
(iii) When conducting an auction, the privatization agent discloses information to one
bidder only. When conducting private negotiations the privatization agent publicly discloses
information to both bidders. Private negotiations raise more revenue for good companies,
auctions raise more revenues for bad companies.
(iv) When conducting an auction, the privatization official discloses information to both
bidders.  When conducting private negotiations, the privatization agent reveals information to
one bidder only.  Auctions raise more revenues than private negotiations.
Proof:  in Appendix.
Proposition 6 provides us with new insights about the interaction between the private
benefits of control, the firing threat, and the negotiation game between the privatization agent and
the potential buyer. It implies four scenarios. In scenario (i) the privatization agent reveals
information to both bidders regardless of the mechanism used. This happens when p takes very
high values, or when W is very high. Such a case is illustrated in Section 3.
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In scenario (ii) the privatization agent reveals information to one bidder only regardless
of the mechanism used. Here, Proposition 6 presents an intriguing result: even if the privatization
agent is so corrupt that half of the company's value disappears in the pocket of the colluding
parties (recall that E(bw) is strictly less than  
2
vv+
), private negotiations led by this corrupt
official can raise more value than the corresponding asymmetric information auction can. A case
for scenario (ii) is illustrated in Example 1.  Proposition 6 also highlights the limitation of private
negotiations.  The success of private negotiations critically depends on the privatization official in
charge of the negotiations.  For example, auctions raise more revenues than private negotiations,
whenever p*, the price that maximizes the utility of the privatization official given a alls short of
the expected winning bid in the auction with asymmetrically informed bidders E(bw).
In scenario (iii) the privatization agent publicly reveals information to both
bidders when conducting private negotiations but not when holding an auction. This  happens if
the official faces an increased threat of dismissal (i.e. the political constraints are less severe)
relative to Example 1.  For example, when the political constraints in Example 1 are replaced by
otherwise  0.2 )-p-v( p)-v(   and 3   p- v if   0.1  )( ´=£´--=- epep pvp)v( 
then an agent with bargaining power a = 2/3 (the same a that was assumed in Example 1)
prefers to disclose information to both bidders during private negotiations and the company will
be sold for $5 million. The agent gets 4 million in utility terms which is higher than he could
obtain by disclosing information to one bidder only. In the auction, however, he prefers to
disclose information to one bidder only since by doing so he receives 5.01 million in expected
utility terms.
In scenario (iv) the official's choice of how widely to disseminate information
also depends on the mechanism used. In scenario (iv) auctions raise more revenues than private
negotiations because auctions may induce the privatization official to reveal information to both
bidders.  Notice that the privatization official can only influence the outcome of the auction by his
decision of how many bidders he shares information with. He discloses information to more or
fewer bidders depending on which decision results in higher utility. When p*, the official’s most
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preferred price given a, is close to -v e, he may prefer to reveal information publicly when
conducting an auction.  When negotiating with the colluding bidder, in contrast, the official can
fine-tune the price to p*, which he strictly prefers to e-v . This happens when the threat of
dismissal of the agent is particularly severe for larger value-price differentials. For example,
when the political constraints in Example 1 are replaced by
otherwise  0.3 )-p-v( p)-v(   and  2   p- v if   0.08  )( ´=£´--=- epep pvp)v( 
then an agent with bargaining power a = 2/3 will disclose information  publicly when holding an
auction. He gets 4 million in utility terms for the good company which is more than the 3.49
million that he would get by colluding with one of the bidders. Nevertheless, when conducting
private negotiations, the official will disclose information to one bidder only and enjoy 4.01
million in utility terms.
Thus, when the official has good negotiating skills and is reasonably motivated to raise a
fair price for the company, then except for scenario (iv), private negotiations raise more revenues
than auctions. In scenario (iv) the official is very motivated to avoid severe underpricing but not
so motivated to avoid small value price differences. There is efficient disciplining for large value-
price differences (which matters for the agent particularly when auctions are used), hence the
official discloses information publicly so as to raise the winning bid in the auction.
It also follows from Proposition 6 that if the official has good negotiating skills but does
not have much interest in raising public revenues, then auctions will outperform private
negotiations with respect to revenues raised.
Another comparison relevant for political considerations, is the ex post comparison of
mechanisms.  Here we compare the realiz d winning bid of an auction with the price attained
through private negotiations.
Corollary 1 Suppose that c > e /4 and that p* > v +e.  Then, whenever, the official reveals
information to one bidder only, there is at least one price in the auction which private
negotiations can improve upon.
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Since any bid below  
2
vv+
 is sufficiently high to win the good company with positive
probability in the auction with asymmetrically informed bidders, the corollary above
demonstrates that there is always a price in the auction private negotiations can improve upon ex
post, provided that p*, the price that maximizes the utility of the privatization official exceeds v.
Since low bids are used with high probability (see Example 1) the domination may be quite
strong.  The reverse of the statement is not true: for a range of preferences of the privatization
agent, all prices in the auction are dominated by private negotiations.  Even if the official is so
corrupt, that his most preferred price for a good company is 
2
vv+
, then all prices in the auction
can be improved upon by private negotiations.  The situation is somewhat different when
disclosure rules are not in effect.
5. Privatization when no disclosure laws are in effect
When information disclosure is not required, then it is potentially advantageous for the non-
colluding party to purchase information. Our analysis in this section shows that the qualitative
results we derived previously are not simply an artifact of the disclosure laws.
      The official 
       reveals The bidders may Auction    Ownership is
information to one  (privately) or private          transferred.
   both or none            purchase negotiation
 of the bidders. information. takes place.
         0                 1                       2                     3                      4
Figure 5: The timing of the model when no disclosure rules are in effect.
In this case the information structure is asymmetric: the colluding parties do not know
whether they face an informed or an uninformed bidder in the sealed-bid auction.  The lack of
disclosure protects the non-colluding agent and makes it worthwhile for him to purchase
information in equilibrium with some probability.  In equilibrium everyone will assess these
23
probabilities correctly but only the bidder himself can tell when he is actually informed and when
he is uninformed.  Having an informational advantage, a non-colluding bidder can compete away
part of the rent the colluding parties could otherwise realize from their cost advantage.  As a
result more revenues can be raised from privatization when information disclosure is not
mandated.
Let EV* stand for  
2
vv +
if  
2
vv +
is an allowable bid, and for the closest allowable bid to
2
vv +
from above if  
2
vv +
 is not an allowable bid.  Then,
Proposition 7 When no disclosure rules are in effect and when the privatization agent discloses
information to one bidder only, then, depending on the cost of purchasing information, the
following applies:
(1) If c £ e /4, then the noncolluding party always purchases information and the subsequent
sealed-bid auction facilitates the transfer of ownership for the good company at a price  p =
Î-v ;
(2) If c > max 
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì ---
2
,
4
** eEVv
 
EV v
holds, then no party purchases information.  There is
a unique perfect Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in the subsequent
sealed-bid auction in which the expected winning bid for the good company is significantly
below the unconditional expected value, 
2
vv+
.
(3) If e / 4 < c < max 
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì ---
2
,
4
** eEVv
 
EV v
holds, then the noncolluding party will
purchase information with some probability.  There is a unique perfect Nash equilibrium in
the subsequent sealed-bid auction in which the noncolluding party  plays mixed strategies
conditional on whether or not he has purchased information.  The expected price at which a
good company is sold is higher when disclosure rules are not in effect than when they are in
effect.
Proof: in Appendix.
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Notice that in scenarios (1) and (2) the expected price at which the good company is sold
is the same no matter whether or not disclosure rules are in effect.  Unlike scenarios (1) and (2),
in scenario (3) the expected price at which a good company is sold is higher when disclosure
rules are not in effect. Whenever e/4 < c < max
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì ---
2
,
4
** eEVv
 
EV v
holds, then the
noncolluding party is willing to purchase information with some probability since his purchase of
information can not be detected by the colluding parties.  He would be willing to purchase
information as long as the cost of purchasing information can be recovered11.  In equilib ium, the
noncolluding party purchases information with some probability and bids differently depending
on whether or not he is informed.  When he purchased information and learned that the company
is good, the noncolluding party is willing to bid higher than when he is ignorant about the value
of the company.  In a perfect equilibrium parties do not play weakly dominated strategies.  In
particular, they do not bid more than v when they know that the company is of low quality.
After iteratively eliminating dominated strategies that can not be played with positive
probability in any perfect Nash equilibrium, we get that (1) when uninformed, the noncolluding
party will not bid above the unconditional expected value with positive probability; (2) when
uninformed, the noncolluding party will bid v with positive probability for the good company; (3)
no informed party will bid v with positive probability for the good company; (4) the colluding
party will bid more aggressively than the noncolluding party.
      Example 2:
      Let v = 1 million and v= $6 million and let the minimum increment be $1 million.  Let,
furthermore, the cost of information purchase be $750,000. The unconditional expected value of
the company is $3.5 million.  The political constraints and the outcome of the private negotiations
are specified as in Example 1.
After iteratively eliminating dominated strategies, the remaining bids for the non-
colluding party are 1, 2, 3 and 4.  Bidding 1 yields 0 to the noncolluding party when  uninformed
and a loss when he is informed.  Bidding 2 yields 4
2
2q - 0.5 to the non-colluding party when he is
                                            
11  He would always purchase information if 
4
Î
£c .
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uninformed, whereas only 4
2
2q - 0.75 when he is informed.  Therefore, buying information and
bidding 2 for the good company is dominated by not buying information and bidding 2.  Bidding
3 when uninformed  yields 1
2
3 32 -÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
q
q and is dominated by buying information and bidding 3
for the good company only, a strategy that yields 0.75.
2
q
3q 32 -÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+   Similarly, the noncolluding
party bids 4 only if he has good information.  Bidding 4 for the good company and bidding 1 for
the bad company would yield an informed non-colluding party  ,75.0
2
2 432 -÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ ++
q
qq  whereas
bidding 4 would yield an uninformed non-colluding party .2
2
2 432 -÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ ++
q
qq
Solving the corresponding optimization problem we get p1 = 3/7, p2 = 0, p3 = 2/7, p4 =
2/7.  That is, the noncolluding party purchases information with probability 4/7 and if he learns
the company is good, he bids either $3 or $4 million with probability half each.  If he learns the
company is bad, he bids $1 million for sure. With probability 3/7 he remains ignorant and bids no
higher than $1 million. In contrast, the colluding party bids either $2 or $4 million for the good
company with probability half each.  He bids $4 million half of the times, a bid high enough to
win against an equally informed bidder.  He also bids $2 million half of the times to take
advantage of bidding against an uniformed bidder. For the bad company, the colluding bidder
bids $1 million.
Bidders bid more aggressively in the case of no disclosure than in the case of full
disclosure.  They both bid $4 million with positive probability in the case of no disclosure, a bid
none of them placed with positive probability in the case of full information disclosure.  Were the
cost of information lower, they would bid even more aggressively.  In contrast, if c were to
exceed $2 million, the non-colluding party would never purchase information and would bid the
same as in Example 1.
The non-colluding party has no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy even
after purchasing information and learning that the company is good.  Notice that he is indifferent
between bidding $3 and $4 million for the good company both ex ante and ex post provided that
the colluding party follows his equilibrium strategy.  The noncolluding party would profit less by
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bidding higher than $4 or lower than $3 million after getting good information.  Notice also that
the noncolluding bidder does not bid the same as the colluding bidder even when they both know
the value of the company. The reason is that even though the two bidders have the same
information about the value of the company then, the noncolluding party is better informed than
the colluding party.  In contrast to the colluding party, the noncolluding party knows when he is
informed and when he is uninformed.
The joint distribution of bids for the good company is shown in Table 2 and is illustrated
in Figure 6 and 7.  The expected price at which a good company is sold is $3.4 million in this
case.  This price is about 20 percent higher than the $2.8 million price the auction raises when
disclosure rules are in effect but still falls short of the $4 million the agent would be able to raise
through private negotiations.  However, when the official's only option is to conduct an auction
he prefers the expected winning bid of $3.4 million to the $5 million he can raise by foregoing his
bribe and revealing information to both bidders.  His utility from raising $5 million by foregoing
his bribe and revealing information to both bidders is $4 million.  When he reveals information to
one bidder only, he raises $2 million with probability 3/14, $3 million with probability 1/7 and $4
million with probability 9/14 for the good company.  He receives a bribe of 3/14 ´ a ´ $4 + 1/7 ´
a ´ 3 million + 9/14 ´ a ´ 2 million = 18/7 a. When for example a = 2/3, he prefers revealing
information to one bidder only since by doing so, he expects 4.9 million in utility terms. ¨
So far we assumed that the privatization agent discloses information to one party only.
The next proposition establishes that, as in the case of disclosure rules, the privatization agent
will disclose information to at least one party even when no disclosure rules are in effect.  Since
there is imperfect monitoring of information purchases, we need to establish that the privatization
agent can not make himself better off by confusing bidders and designating no one with some
probability when bidders can privately purchase information.
Proposition 8 When no disclosure rules are in effect then the privatization agent always reveals
information to at least one bidder.
Proof: in Appendix.
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As Proposition 8 demonstrates the official will always prefer disclosing information to
both bidders to not disclosing information to anyone.  Depending on his preferences, he either
discloses information to one bidder only (see Example 2) or to both bidders (see the case of the
voluntary information revelation).
Having established the equilibrium bids in the auction, it is straightforward to see that
Corollary 1 would also hold for the case when information disclosure is not mandated.  That is,
when c > e/4 and when p*, the price that maximizes the utility of the privatization official, given
a, exceeds v, then no matter what the preferences of the privatization agent are, there is at least
one price in the auction which private negotiations can improve upon.  It is important to point out
that the probabilities implied by the two scenarios are quite different. When information
disclosure is not required, auctions produce higher revenues (see Proposition 7).  Depending on
the preferences of the privatization official, private negotiations may still raise more value than
auctions but for a smaller range of parameter values since the expected winning bid in the auction
is higher when information disclosure is not mandated.  The comparison of the two cases reveals
that information disclosure rules give rise to lower public revenues and higher bribes.
6 Regulatory implications
There are several policy implications one can draw from our model.  The first implication
concerns the design of privatization auctions and the dissemination of information, in particular
the cost of information relative to the bidding increment.  Auctions designed with high bidding
increments may give rise to higher public revenues and lower bribes.  Intuitively, the higher the
bidding increment, the more costly a wrong bid, and the more useful is information.  Low cost
information will reduce the unfair advantage of the colluding bidder and will make it more likely
that higher prices should be attained in auctions.  In particular, if the cost of information is less
than a quarter of the bidding increment, then there is no way that an official can manipulate the
outcome of the auction by strategically releasing  information to a favorite bidder.
Thus, incremental bids are beneficial by leaving some profit on the table to bidders which
induces information acquisition. It is a natural question to ask, however, whether there are
alternative mechanisms to achieve this goal. One such mechanism would be subsidizing
information acquisition by bidders or subsidizing the cost of producing information. Since
subsidies can distort the incentives to produce quality information and can lead to inefficiencies,
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it is unclear whether subsidization would be a less costly mechanism than the setting of high
bidding increments.
The second, perhaps most striking implication of our model concerns the choice of
privatization mechanisms.  A general implication of our theory is that the choice of privatization
mechanism depends on the availability and dissemination of information and the severity of
political constraints.  Our model suggests that in economies or in industries where information is
widely available, valuation is straightforward and political constraints do not matter, auctions and
private negotiations are equally successful in raising revenues.  In contrast, in economies or
industries where information is scarce, valuation is highly uncertain and political constraints are
present, then one or the other mechanism emerges as the winner.  The crux of the issue is the
recognition that a corrupt official will be corrupt whether he is negotiating in private or
organizing an auction.  Whereas an official can both compromise auctions and private
negotiations he or she has much less direct control of the outcome of an auction than the outcome
of private negotiations.  Whereas private negotiations can attain the price corresponding to the
official’s constrained optimum, the expected winning bid in the corresponding auction may very
well exceed or fall short of the agent’s target.
It is interesting to note how the agent’s bargaining power a, affects the public revenues
generated by the two mechanisms.  The higher the privatization official’s bargaining power is, the
less likely it is that he will voluntarily disclose information and the more likely it is that he will
collude with one of the bidders regardless of the mechanism used. Thus, a  higher a may actually
translate into lower public revenues.
Notice also that whereas a does not affect the outcome of the auction directly, only
through the official’s decision concerning the disclosure of information, it directly influences the
price attained through private negotiations. Given that the privatization agent colludes with one of
the bidders, the more bargaining power the agent has, or the better negotiating skills he possesses,
the more public revenues private negotiations generate.
It is interesting to relate our paper to Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) who analyze the
outcomes of privatizations in several countries and compare the returns to IPOs in the private
sector to those in the public sector in various industrialized and developing countries. Although
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) study stock market privatizations and our paper focuses on
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private negotiations and auctions, both papers aim to examine the effect of the degree of market
development on the terms of privatizations. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) find that both raw
returns and market adjusted returns are generally much higher in Hungary, Malaysia, Poland and
Thailand than they are in Canada, France, Japan and the U.K. This finding is consistent with the
setting of our model, since in the former countries markets are less transparent and more
amenable to the type of collusion we describe. Furthermore, the private and government sector
are generally quite intertwined in these countries. Dewenter and Malatesta also document a
significant positive relationship between a variable indicating “primitive capital markets” and
market adjusted returns in privatizations, which is again consistent with the thrust of our model.
 We have studied privatization auctions and private negotiations led by a potentially
corruptible government agent. Another interesting question to analyze is whether hiring an
investment bank or a consulting firm can substantially alter the relationship between the seller’s
agent and the bidders in the privatization process. Depending on the information partition and the
negotiating skills of the investment banker there are several cases to be considered.
If the investment banker is perfectly motivated by reputational considerations, then
Proposition 2 applies and auctions will be as good in raising revenues as private negotiations. If,
however, the investment banker is interested in providing special treatment to a favorite
customer, then we are back in the setting of the approachable agents.
Obviously if both agents are approachable, then they may collude with each other, in
which case our analysis in Section 4 and 5 would directly apply.  If they refuse to collude with
each other, then each can compete away the other’s rents. For example, if the official, the
investment banker and the research company are equally informed and the investment banker is
conducting an auction, then the investment banker will disclose information to one or both
bidders and one of two cases will apply: (i) The official and the investment banker would secretly
collude with a bidder; or (ii) The official would publicly disclose information (even if the
investment banker would not). In either case more revenues are raised when an investment banker
or a consulting firm is hired to conduct the auction.12 When the investment banker is conducting
private negotiations, then unless the official and the investment banker decide to collude, the
official will disclose all information publicly even if the investment banker would prefer not to.
                                            
12 The only exception is when c < e/4 and when information disclosure is not mandated. In this case,
revenues are the same whether or not an investment banker is hired to conduct the auction.
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Suppose that the official is better informed than the investment banker and the research
company (for example the official knows the sequencing of future privatization and the others do
not). Suppose furthermore that the official and the investment banker would not collude with each
other. Then in the auction the official may collude with a bidder or may make the information
public. When the investment banker is conducting private negotiations, the official may disclose
his information publicly or may collude with the chosen bidder in exchange for a bribe. In the
latter case even if the investment banker is a better negotiator than the official, it is possible that
the hiring of an investment banker leads to lower prices. As we pointed out earlier in this section,
a higher a may actually translate into lower public revenues by making it less likely for the
investment banker to publicly disclose information.
Finally if the official has less precise information than the investment banker or the
research company, then his decision to disclose information publicly or privately will affect the
outcome of the auction but may not affect the outcome of the private negotiations. For example, if
the expected value of the company conditional on the official’s information is less than the price
the investment banker would negotiate, then the official’s action will not influence the outcome
of the negotiations.
Since a foreign investment banker is less likely to collude with the government agent (but
equally likely to collude with a bidder, especially with foreign bidders), our  discussion above can
be interpreted to imply that hiring a foreign investment bank to conduct privatization auctions or
private negotiations is likely to increase the transparency of the privatization process. On the
other hand, a foreign investment bank is likely to hire well-connected resident experts to conduct
the auctions or the negotiations.  Since these experts may themselves be inclined to collude with
the government agent, it is unclear to what extent the hiring of an investment banker (domestic or
foreign) would benefit the privatization process.
7 Further discussion of related literature
Laffont and Tirole (1993) that is perhaps the closest to our analysis, investigate auction design
when a supervisory agent can collude with a public utility bidding for a procurement contract.
The authors consider a situation wherein the principal – a social welfare maximizing government
– aims to award a procurement contract to the company with the lower cost or higher quality or
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both.  The cost, and the quality, are private information of the bidding firms, and the government
appoints a supervisor to make inferences about these parameters.  Since the supervisor may be
tempted to collude with one of the bidding parties, the social welfare maximizing government
may wish to bias the auction in favor of the party who is presumed not to have taken part in any
collusion.  In contrast to the Laffont and Tirole (1993), the information problem in our model is
with respect to the value of the company.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the sale by auction of mineral rights on a tract
of offshore territory (Wilson (1967), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom
and Weber (1983), Hendricks, Porter and Tan (1993), Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994)).
Wilson (1967), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983),
Hendricks, Porter and Tan (1993), Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994) investigate asymmetric
auctions in which all of the bidders have access to publicly available geological data but one of
the bidders has additional proprietary information acquired as result of work performed on an
adjacent tract.  Wilson (1967) introduces the model of auctions with asymmetric information.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983) characterize the equilibrium solution for the
case when the set of possible values for the mineral rights and the set of allowable bids coincide.
The authors find that the informed bidder bids his assessment of the true value in equilibrium.
Their novel result, however, does not extend to the case when the set of values are coarser or finer
than the set of allowable bids (our case).  Milgrom and Weber (1982) focus on the value of
acquiring additional information in the asymmetric auction setting of Wilson (1967) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983).  The authors find that the informed bidder’s
profit rises when he gathers more information, and the increase is greater when it is publicly
known that he has gathered additional information.  In contrast, the uninformed would prefer to
collect information secretly.  If the seller has access to some of the informed bidder’s
information, he can raise the price by making it public, whereas if the seller’s information is
complementary to that of the better informed bidder, then publicizing his information, the seller
would lower the expected price.  In our setting of costly information, acquisition of information
by the uninformed only raises the expected price in the auction but yields no profit to the bidder
himself regardless of how the information was collected.  Moreover, in contrast to the revenue-
maximizing seller in Milgrom and Weber (1982) who has no conflict of interest and who would
not collude with any of the bidders, our seller, facing political constraints and agency problems, is
not necessarily better off by making the informed bidder’s information public.  Since a seller has
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less control over the outcome of an auction than over the outcome of private negotiations, we
come up with the surprising conclusion that private negotiations often dominate auctions.
Taking the analysis of Wilson (1967) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber
(1983) one step further, H ndricks, Porter and Tan (1993) investigate the optimality of
simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions versus posted sale mechanisms for federal offshore
lease sales.  Hendricks, Porter and Tan (1993) find that simultaneous first-price auctions
dominate posted sale mechanisms.  The intuition is that in the posted sale mechanism the
informed bidder can send a sufficiently large number of “dummy” firms and thereby drive out the
uninformed firms whereas in the first-price sealed-bid auction an informed bidder has no
incentive to send more than one representative since only the highest bid matters.  The authors do
not consider private negotiations.  Their intriguing result that auctions dominate posted sale
mechanisms is not applicable to privatization auctions in emerging market economies, however,
since in these auction bidders are typically prescreened and preselected.Hendricks, Porter and
Wilson (1994) generalize their result to simultaneous first price auctions with random reservation
price.
In the context of the selling of a company or a fraction thereof, Bulow and Klemperer
(1996) and Novaes (1995) study the implications of mechanism design.  Bulow andKlemperer
(1996) show that auctions dominate private negotiations from the seller’s point of view since an
auction can always attract additional bidders and thereby attain higher prices ex ante than private
negotiations.  Novaes (1995) finds that selling the firm directly to the manager, who knows the
value of the company, is optimal for shareholders, who do not know the value of the company,
only if the board of directors can commit to acquire information in case the manager does not pay
the asking price.  If this commitment is not possible then shareholders are better off with a sealed-
bid second price auction.  Novaes (1995)’s setting is that of a collusion between potential buyers
in an asymmetric auction setting with a seller (the board of directors) who has no discretion over
information, whereas ours is that of a collusion between buyers and a seller, who has discretion
over information.  Bulow and Klemperer’s result does not apply in our privatization setting where
potential bidders come from a tight group of insiders and are screened well in advance to assure
that they can raise the necessary funds to finance the deal.
In a completely different setting from this paper, Manelli and Vincent (1995) obtain a
result that is similar in spirit to ours.  Manelli and Vincent (1995) study procurement contracts
when, unlike in our paper, the seller has better information about the quality of the good to be
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sold than the buyer does ex ante and a court can not verify quality ex post.  Their model is most
concerned with the adverse selection aspect of procurement contracts.  Interestingly enough, the
authors find that if the potential from trade is large and if the buyer values marginal quality more
than the sellers, then arbitrarily selecting a seller and tendering a take-it-or-leave-it offer
maximizes expected social surplus – competition among sellers can not be exploited to improve
upon this outcome.  On the other hand, if sellers value marginal quality more than the buyer, an
auction is the optimal institution.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed the privatization process within an agency framework.  We have focused
on the role of a privatization agent and demonstrated that a potential agency conflict may
substantially affect the choice of privatization mechanism. An agency problem spanned by
political constraints has interesting implications.  Private negotiations raise more value than
auctions when the agent in charge highly values staying in office and uses his bargaining power
to negotiate his target price.  Alternatively, when conducted by a less motivated agent who would
not put pressure on the bidders to raise the price, auctions raise more revenues than private
negotiations.  The presence of other bidders in the auction, regardless of how informed they are,
induces competition and places a lower bound on the equilibrium winning bid.  Our research
highlights how the economic setting, the effectiveness of the political process, the severity of the
political constraints and the availability of information affect the choice of mechanism between
privatization auctions and private negotiations.  Moreover, our theory sheds some light to the
puzzling statistics shown in Figure 1 demonstrating the widespread use of private negotiations in
economies where political constraints are significant.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4:
     Step 1: Information purchase (c £ Î / 4).
     Whenever the uninformed purchases information, then with probability 1/2 he learns that
he is bidding for the good company.  Since disclosure rules are in effect, his information
acquisition is disclosed to the colluding parties.  Consequently, both bidders bid Î-v  n perfect
equilibrium (Proposition 1) and the non-colluding party makes a gross profit of Î with
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probability 1/2.  Consequently, it is only worthwhile for the uninformed to purchase information
if c £ Î / 4.
     Step 2: No information purchase (c>Î/4). Nonexistence of pure strategy equilibrium.
     Suppose the uninformed bids bu and the informed bids v or bi conditional on the value of
the company.  If the informed bids more than E(v) for the good company then the uninformed
bidder’s best response is to bid v (any above v bid would bring an expected loss to the
uninformed).  However, if the uninformed bids v, then the informed’s best response is to bid v +
Î for the good company.  If the informed bids less than E(v) then the uninformed’s best response
is to outbid him.  However, for any bid by the uninformed, the informed’s best response to
outbid him whenever they bid for the good company.  Finally, if the informed bids E(v) for the
good company, then the uninformed will stay away from this bid.  Consequently, there exists no
pure strategy equilibrium.
Step 3: Characterization of the perfect equilibrium when c >Î/4.
The perfect equilibrium can be computed using iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies.  In a perfect equilibrium the only strategies that are played with positive probabilities
are those that survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.  Bidding v for the goo
company is strongly dominated for the colluding bidder.  Bidding  more than v for th  bad
company is weakly dominated for the colluding bidder.  Bidding more than E(v) is weakly
dominated for the noncolluding bidder.  Taking the iteration one step further, bidding more than
E(v + Î) is also weakly dominated for the colluding bidder.  If the colluding party bids E(v) or
above with positive probability for the good company then the noncolluding party will never bid
E(v) since bidding E(v) would yield him an expected loss.
Step 4:  Uniqueness when c > Î/4.
It follows from step 3 that there exists Cb
~
Î ( v,v ) such that for every Cb > Cb
~
 BRN
(bC ) =  v where BRN is the best response correspondence for the noncolluding party.  We select
the smallest of these Cb
~
s and denote it by .Cˆb   We know from Step 2 and Step 3 that whenever
the noncolluding party bids between )2,( Î-vv the colluding party’s best response is to outbid
him.  Similarly, whenever the colluding party’s strategy specifies an expected bid Cb < ,Cˆb  it is
the noncolluding party’s best response to outbid him.  Consequently, for any CC bb ˆ< , the
hyperplane NC bb = would separate 1)( -CBR  and NBR where 1)( -CBR  is the inverse
correspondence of the colluding party’s best response correspondence.  Hence, there exists no
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,CˆC bb <  such that .))()( 1-= CNNC bBRbBR   Since from step 3 we know that there exists
no Nb such that ,)( vbBR NC =  therefore, Cbˆ is the unique solution to
.))(()( 1-= NCCN bBRbBR   It follows from Step 2 that there exists no Nash equilibrium in
which the colluding party would play a pure strategy, therefore, Cbˆ must b  the outcome of a
mixed strategy.  Since the colluding bidder would not be willing to play the same nondegenerate
mixed strategies against different mixed strategies by the noncolluding bidder there is a unique
Nb that solves CNC bbBR ˆ)( = .  Consequently, there is a unique perfect equilibrium in mixed
strategies.  Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium as an intersection of the bidders’ best response
correspondences on an example when E(v)=11.
Step 5: The expected price of the good firm is less than .
2
vv+
(i)  When E(v) is an acceptable bid, it trivially follows from step 3 that no bidder will bid
higher than E(v) and that no bidder will bid E(v) with probability 1 for the good company.
Consequently, the expected price of the good firm is less than 
2
vv+
.
(ii)  When E(v) is not an acceptable bid, then let EV* and EV* denote the closest
allowable bid that bracket 
2
vv+
 from above and below, respectively.  Note that since both v a d
v  are acceptable bids, EV* = 
2
Î++vv
 and EV* = 2
Î-+vv
.  Then, we need to show that qI the
probability the informed bids EV* is less than half.  For the colluding bidder to bid EV* it must be
the case that the non-colluding bidder bids EV* w th some probability.  For the non-colluding
bidder to bid EV* it must be the case that
,0)(Pr)(
2 **
* ³´-+ winsEVobEVv
EV N
)(2
)(Pr
*
*
* EVv
EV
winsEVob N
-
³ .
Since ³
*-
*
EVv
EV
 ½, therefore, Prob(EV*
N wins) ³ ¼.  However, for Prob(EV*N wins) ³ ¼, it must
be the case that the noncolluding bidder bids EV* for the good company with probability less than
½.  But if it is the case, then the expected winning bid for the good company is less than E(v).
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Obviously, the colluding party may not bid as high as EV* with positive probability in which case
the expected winning bid is even lower. ¨
Proof of Proposition 5:
Step 1:  
4
Î£c
The official is better off disclosing information to both bidders than not disclosing it to
anyone.  He gets no bribe either way, but in the former scenario he is more likely to stay in office.
This so since an uninformed would never bid Î-  with probability 1 regardless of what his
beliefs are about the other bidder.  The official’s expected gain from disclosing information to
both bidders as opposed to none is bounded from below by .))()((
22
Wvv ´Î-- pp   Whenever
,4/£Îc  revealing information to one bidder dominates revealing information to both or none of
the bidders.  This is because when the official reveals information to one bidder then the non-
colluding bidder will purchase information, the bids will tie at Î-v for the good company and
when the colluding bidder wins, the official also gets a side-payment.
Step 2: 
4
Î>c .  Revealing information to one, both or none of the bidders may raise
the same revenue when 
4
Î>c .  However, the official strictly prefers revealing information to one
bidder only to his other options since this is the only way he can receive an additional side-
payment.
Consequently, not revealing information to any bidder is not part of any perfect
equilibrium. ¨
Proof of Proposition 6:
The proof of  (i) is straightforward (see Section 3) and is omitted.
(ii) The price the privatization official negotiates will exceed E(v).  Since the expected
winning bid in the auction is less then E(v) (see Proof of Proposition 4), the negotiated price will
exceed any equilibrium winning bid in the auction.
The proof of (iii) and (iv) is straightforward (see examples on pages 22-23) and is omitted. ¨
Proof of Corollary 1:
It follows from the Proof of Proposition 4 that in the auction Î+v  will be a winning bid
for the good company with positive probability in the perfect equilibrium when 4/>Îc .
Whenever the price at which the utility of the privatization agent is maximized exceeds v then
private negotiations will attain at least Î+v .  It also follows from the Proof of Proposition 4 that
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the highest winning bid for the good company in the auction is EV*.  Consequently, if the price at
which the utility of the privatization agent is maximized exceeds EV*, then the negotiated price
will exceed any price attainable through auction. 
Proof of Proposition 7:
The proof of Step 1, 2, 4 and 5 are identical to that of Step 1, 2, 4 and 5 in Proposition 4
and are omitted.  The proof of Step 3 is shown below.
Step 3:  
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì<<Î Î-
*-*-
24
,max4/ EVvEVvc
If the colluding party plays his equilibrium strategy derived in the proof of Proposition 4,
then it is worthwhile for the uniformed to purchase information and to outbid him as long as the
conditions of Proposition 7 hold.  On the other hand, given that the non-colluding party purchases
information then the colluding party’s best response is to outbid him so that the resulting winning
bid for the good company will be Î-v (see also Proposition 1).  If, on the other hand, the non-
colluding party bids Î-v  for the good company then the non-colluding party will never
purchase any information as long as
c ³ Î / 4.  However, if the non-colluding party will never purchase any information then the
colluding party will bid the same as in Proposition 4.  Consequently, the non-colluding party will
purchase information with some probability (less than 1) in any perfect Nash equilibrium and the
winning bids will exceed those in Proposition 4.  ¨
Proof of Proposition 8:
Step 1:  
4
Î<c .  The official is at least as well off or is better off by disclosing
information to both bidders than by not disclosing information to anyone.  When the official
discloses information to both bidders, they bid Î-v for the good company with probability 1
(see Proposition 1).  When the official does not disclose information to anyone than depending on
the bidders' information acquisition and their beliefs about the other bidder's information they bid
Î-v  for the good company with probability 1 or less (see Proposition 1) and they bid less
otherwise.
Step 2:  
4
Î³c . Revealing information to one, both or none of the bidders may raise the
same revenue when 
4
Î£c .  However, the official strictly prefers revealing information to one
bidder only to his other options since this is the only way he can guarantee his side-payment.
Consequently, not revealing information to any bidder is not part of any mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. ¨
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